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A United States Armed Forces High Mobile Rocket System (HIMARS) fires a rocket during a 2016 military exercise in Kuwait. Ukraine has been supplied with 4 such systems, and more deliveries are expected.

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July 21, 2022

For weeks now, Ukraine’s government has been promising to start the long-expected summer counter-offensive against Russian forces occupying Ukrainian land. Even if not officially announced yet, the operation is almost certainly underway at this very moment. Its goal, according to Ukrainian officials, is to “de-occupy” as much land as possible. Some have even stated that they plan to “de-occupy” the entirety of Kherson Oblast, a region of Ukraine that’s mostly under Russian control, as early as September. They hope that Ukraine’s armies will be able to meet this goal and even go further. As many as one million Ukrainian soldiers are expected to take part in this epic climax of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This offensive is one that could play out in so many ways, but inevitably, it will only play out in one way. Only time will tell what path the offensive will take, but it never hurts to guess what that path will be beforehand. In this post, I will explore several possible parallels, and compare them with the situation on the ground today in an attempt to figure out how the offensive might ultimately play out.

Scenario 1: Total Defeat

The 2022 engagements of the Russo-Ukrainian War have frequently been compared to the great battles of the Eastern Front of World War II, in which the ancestors of many Russians and Ukrainians fought side-by-side against the Nazi invaders. One engagement that in many ways mirrors the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive in terms of the conditions at its start, at least in my opinion, is the famous 1943 Battle of Kursk. This was the largest tank battle in history and is famous for being one of the biggest absolute reversals in World War II. It started out as an Axis attempt to cut off a huge Soviet salient (bulge) on the Eastern Front. Two Axis armies (each with thousands of tanks) were sent to the very edge of the salient, and they were to move across the plains of the Russian steppe, catching the Soviet army in a trap. However, the Soviets were forewarned by British codebreakers of the Axis plans and responded by sending their own tank armies to the exact places that the Axis armies were supposed to pass through. The Axis advanced a few kilometers and pushed the Soviets back, but found themselves unable to go further. It was then that the Soviets launched their own counterattack, and completely reversed the situation in two major offensives. By the time the dust finally settled (the fighting produced so much that planes couldn’t fly in the area for weeks), the Soviets had recaptured all territory lost to the Axis in the initial offensive and also gained additional territory along a 2,000 km front. The Red Army lost about half a million men, including my own great-great-grandfather, who went missing at Kursk. However, the theme of the fighting on the Eastern front underwent a permanent shift, going from Axis attacks and Soviet responses to them to Soviet attacks and usually unsuccessful Axis responses. The Axis received a devastating punch in the gut from which they never recovered. It would be Ukraine’s worst nightmare if the summer counteroffensive ends up like the Battle of Kursk in any way. If the offensive will happen, it will in some ways look very much like the Axis operation that kicked off Kursk. Ukraine’s soldiers are making several relatively narrow prongs intended to besiege a large pocket of Russian troops. They are throwing everything they had, much like the Axis at Kursk, at the Russians in the places that they plan to attack. However, the offensives are different in one major respect which makes a total reversal highly unlikely. At Kursk, while the Axis had superior artillery and planes (which ended up entirely useless because they couldn’t fly through the Kursk dust cloud), the iconic Soviet T-34 surprised the Axis tanks with its high resistance and high speed, which allowed it to outmaneuver its technologically more advanced foes. So it could be said that a superior Soviet tank won the day. On the battlefield in Ukraine, the situation is reversed entirely. The Russians have to rely increasingly on older tank models like the Soviet-era T-72, while the Ukrainians are receiving new, top-grade American weaponry. Probably the most powerful weapon that they’ve received is the American HIMARS. This is a powerful rocket launch system that can destroy multiple far-away targets simultaneously. The Russians have no equivalent weapons, which gives the Ukrainians a huge advantage, as they can destroy Russian tanks from far away with minimal damage to themselves*. Yet the Ukrainians have one problem: they only have twelve such systems. If the Russians can destroy at least some of them in a quick attack, the Ukrainian defensive capabilities will be severely reduced. If the fierce Russian defenses at the front can contain the Ukrainian counteroffensive, a powerful frontal attack by a massive Russian force in response could potentially repeat the results of the Soviet Kursk offensives, as the Ukrainians won’t be able to fight off a wave of Russian attacks without the HIMARS. Such an offensive could potentially chase the Ukrainians back, leading to significant Russian gains. Russian forces could enter the fiercely contested port city of Mykolaiv, a potential springboard for an attack on Ukraine’s biggest port: Odessa. They could also advance north and complete the conquest of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and take more territory in other places. Of course, if Ukrainian morale still remains strong even if the HIMARS systems are destroyed, it’s unlikely that the Russians will be so successful. However, the greatest generals must always plan for failures. And as unlikely as the scenario is, it’s still quite possible.

Scenario 2: Status Quo

From early 1942 to early 1943, the bloodiest campaign on the Eastern Front was waged. This campaign is known in the West as the Battles of Rzhev. To veterans, it’s known as the “Rzhev meat-grinder,” a name that it rightly deserves. Over the course of one year, millions of soldiers engaged in World War I — style trench warfare around the Soviet city of Rzhev. Though both sides suffered millions of casualties, the frontline in the area remained almost static as it moved back and forth almost everywhere else. The reason for this was that the Axis heavily fortified the area around Rzhev, which they hoped to use as a launchpad for a second attempt to take Moscow. They failed to do this, but the fortifications around Rzhev were impervious to assault. In the end, neither side managed to overcome the other, and the Axis ultimately withdrew due to defeats elsewhere with intact offensive capabilities (these were destroyed at Kursk months later). Some observers have noted that the current Russo-Ukrainian War is descending into World War I — style fighting, with both sides constructing serious fortifications and engaging in deadly but indecisive artillery duels and occasional offensives. If this continues, the war may look a lot like the Battles of Rzhev. However, if this does happen, it can only mean one thing: the Ukrainian counteroffensive will ultimately “de-occupy” very little territory. If the Ukrainians fail to breach Russian fortifications or do breach them but only advance a small distance, then the Russians will be able to hold the front line and keep it largely static. However, a Ukrainian breakthrough is still quite possible, and while the Rzhev scenario is likely, it’s not by any means inevitable. If the Ukrainians do break through, we can take a look at another “meat-grinder” of the Eastern Front to see how they might do it, and what the repercussions may be.

The memorial to the estimated three and a half million Soviet soldiers who fought at Rzhev. About 1/7th never returned home from the bloodiest indecisive battle of World War II.

Scenario 3: Success, with Caveats

On November 19, 1942, a group of Italian and Romanian soldiers guarding a relatively peaceful part of the Eastern Front woke up to the sound of thirteen thousand four hundred and fifty one artillery pieces, eight hundred and ninety four tanks, and one thousand five hundred aircraft bombarding them. Shortly afterwards, an army of over one million Soviet troops charged at the stunned Nazi allies with full force from two direction. On November 23, in what became one of the most celebrated events of the entire war, the two columns of the Red Army linked up, having completely destroyed the underequipped Axis forces in that part of the front. However, the capture hundreds of kilometers of land in what became known as Operation Uranus wasn’t the reason for the celebrations that propaganda films depicted in its aftermath. This was due entirely to the fact that the operation had severed an army of three hundred thousand Axis soldiers in the Soviet city of Stalingrad from their supply lines. That city had almost totally been overrun by the Nazis and their allies, who’d made it as far as the mighty Volga river that ran next to Stalingrad. However, determined Soviet resistance thwarted their plans to go even further, and Operation Uranus completely turned the tables after its completion. Nazi leadership believed that their army in Stalingrad could be supplied by air, but this proved unfeasible. And Axis attempts to break through the Soviet ring around Stalingrad failed disastrously. The Axis army in Stalingrad finally surrendered on January 30, 1943. It’s likely that the Ukrainian military commanders expect their current offensive to end up something like Stalingrad. They have destroyed all bridges across the Dnieper River, making resupply of Russian forces in parts of Kherson incredibly difficult. And with their massive numbers, the Ukrainians are in a position to win through sheer numerical advantage, outnumbering their Russian foes five to one. (The Soviets outnumbered their Axis foes at Stalingrad by even larger odds, but they didn’t have the weaponry that Ukrainians now have, which could offset the difference). However, the Ukrainians have a problem that the Soviets in Operation Uranus didn’t have. This is the fact that the Russians have heavily fortified their frontline positions along the entire front. An advance is absolutely possible, but unless a total collapse of Russian forces occurs, it’s unlikely to go far. However, declines in Russian morale due to the slow progress of the war, and increasing Russian reliance on old weaponry could ultimately lead to such a collapse in the face of new, Western-manufactured weapons and overwhelming Ukrainian numbers. A Russian collapse could see the Ukrainians make a significant advance, and they could go as far as Kherson city, occupied by the Russians since March. However, the Russians will likely have the advantage after this point. That’s because the Ukrainians will then be faced with the Dnieper, one of the longest and widest rivers in Europe. The Russians could regroup and turn the Dnieper into a new line of defense that would prove to be a huge challenge for the Ukrainians. And if Ukrainian casualties get anywhere near to the number of Soviet casualties at Stalingrad (amounting to over one million), the Ukrainian war effort could end up being totally paralyzed. So while a Ukrainian success along the lines of Operation Uranus is no doubt a possibility, it’s unlikely to be a total victory. However, the Ukrainians can turn to another one of the greatest triumphs of World War II (and all modern warfare)as a model for a more successful counteroffensive than if they copy Operation Uranus.

Battle rages around the Soviet soldiers celebrating the link-up of two armies that have cut off the Axis forces in Stalingrad on November 23, 1942. The Soviets finally defeated that army two months later.

Scenario 4: Total Victory

In the countries of the former Soviet Union, the name Bagration will bring to mind one of two different things. Pyotr Bagration was a Georgian Prince who served as a commander in the Imperial Russian Army and distinguished himself in the war against Napoleon. Operation Bagration was a Soviet World War II offensive in the summer of 1944, which is considered to be one of the greatest Soviet victories of the war. President Volodymyr Zenelskyy, whose grandfather’s division in the Soviet Red Army took part in Bagration, insisted that they would never accept a complete ceasefire against Russia until a complete withdrawal from all Ukrainian lands occupied in 2022. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has just expanded Russia’s war aims to include the full conquest of several Ukrainian oblasts (regions) that the two armies are now contesting, meaning such a withdrawal like the one Ukraine’s leaders are calling for is out of the question. However, Ukraine will still attempt to force the Russians out. If such a remarkable reversal does indeed occur, it will probably look very much like Operation Bagration. In that operation, the Red Army sent over one hundred and fifty divisions in five armies into battle on June 22, 1944, against four completely unsuspecting Nazi armies. The different army groups of the Red Army were able to coordinate attacks effectively, and in less than a week, three Nazi armies lay in ruins. Two months later, an operation that initially was only supposed to conquer central Belarus ended up liberating the entire republic, while also bringing Soviet Troops to the Baltic Sea, cutting off massive German pockets there. It also brought them to the gates of Poland’s Capital, Warsaw. The Germans lost so much equipment and manpower that the Soviets easily conquered all of Western Ukraine, Southern Poland, and Romania in follow-up offensives. I believe that Ukrainian commanders are hoping for a Bagration-like victory in the new counteroffensive, and I really don’t see how anything could be better than that for Ukraine’s armies. Indeed, some parallels between the leadup to the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the leadup to Bagration are fairly obvious. The occupying side in both cases is exhausted after months of non-stop combat and has dug in, hoping to establish a permanent line of defense that may ultimately not hold. Both are summer operations conducted when soldiers and vehicles can move fairly rapidly, and both involved the victorious side moving into the territory of people largely loyal to it. And the numbers in the former and current operations are also heavily skewed in favor of the attacker (five hundred thousand Nazis to about two million Soviets in Bagration and about two hundred thousand Russians to one million Ukrainians). However, differences are also apparent. The key to the success of Bagration was the fact that the Nazis were completely unaware of Soviet preparations for it and only learned that the invasion was going to happen when armies that they didn’t even know existed suddenly started attacking them. In the Information Age that we live in today, such a complete element of surprise is very difficult to achieve. Russia’s high command will likely (but not inevitably) learn of any plans being made, and Ukraine’s leaders certainly aren’t keeping their intentions secret. However, the entire Kherson Counteroffensive might in itself be a ruse that can, in fact, distract the Russians from a Ukrainian offensive in other places, as was the case in Bagration. In any case, even a surprise attack wouldn’t easily overcome Russian defenses (unless it completely catches them off-guard, which won’t be easy for the Ukrainians to do). Russia’s soldiers have much stronger defenses than the Nazis ever did in Bagration, though the Ukrainians admittedly have equally powerful offensive weapons (not to mention HIMARS, which could destroy Russia’s defenses completely). These weapons could ultimately crush Russian defenses, even if Russian soldiers have time to prepare. If this happens, they will be forced to retreat to save themselves from the overwhelming Ukrainian numbers. Such a retreat could, if everything goes Ukraine’s way, indeed end up leading to the Ukrainian de-occupation of all of Mykolaiv oblast (Russia controls a few villages there), and eventually significant gains in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. This would truly be as disastrous for Russia as Bagration was for the Nazis, who had no chance of winning the war after that operation’s conclusion. Of course, a victory of this size will need a lot to go well for the Ukrainians, and this war has seen no shortage of failed offensives. Yet a Ukrainian victory is still possible, and the grandchildren of those who served in Bagration may very well match the glory of their ancestors soon.

Conclusion:

Ultimately, there is no way to predict for certain what will happen. However, I do feel that the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive will be a game-changer in this war and a major turning point. In the end, history must take one path at this fork in the road. I can’t wait to see which one it will choose.

Addendum*: As one of my followers explained, HIMARS is actually not very useful against tanks. It’s more useful against logistics systems and command centers. This can still severely disrupt Russian supply lines, which can significantly decrease the Russians’ ability to protect themselves from Ukrainian attacks.

References:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Development_of_the_battle

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus#:~:text=Operation%20Uranus%20(Russian%3A%20%D0%9E%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%CC%81%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%C2%AB,Army%2C%20the%20Third%20and%20Fourth

https://historyofyesterday.com/battles-of-rzhev-b4483b55dfc7?gi=df1420318d67

https://the-past.com/feature/operation-bagration

https://soyuz.by/en/union-state-news/moscow-metro-to-issue-new-tickets-on-occasion-of-rzhev-memorial-opening

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/26/the-russians-have-nothing-equivalent-how-himars-help-ukraine

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62231936

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-14/russia-turns-to-old-tanks-as-it-burns-through-weapons-in-ukraine

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pyotr-Ivanovich-Knyaz-Bagration

https://www.britannica.com/event/Operation-Bagration

https://www.euronews.com/2022/07/27/ukrainian-army-destroys-key-bridge-in-russian-held-kherson-region

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/ukraine-is-massing-1-million-troops-to-fight-the-russian-military/

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/18/world/russia-ukraine-biden-putin

https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-visit-to-volodymyr-zelenskyy-s-hometown-kryvyi-rih-city-of-steel-a-95aa1a79-905c-462f-aa02-c61b103321f8

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/24/ukraines-kherson-to-be-liberated-from-russia-by-september-official-a78390

Image Sources:

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/history-through-viewfinder-35

https://www.amusingplanet.com/2020/06/the-rzhev-memorial-to-soviet-soldiers.html

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/putin-has-a-problem-more-himars-rockets-are-headed-to-ukraine

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